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Abstract—Android Framework is a layer of software that
exists in every Android system managing resources of all Android
apps. A vulnerability in Android Framework can lead to severe
hacks, such as destroying user data and leaking private informa-
tion. With tens of millions of Android devices unpatched due to
Android fragmentation, vulnerabilities in Android Framework
certainly attract attackers to exploit them. So far, enormous
manual effort is needed to craft such exploits. To our knowledge,
no research has been done on automatic generation of exploits
that take advantage of Android Framework vulnerabilities. We
make a first step towards this goal by applying symbolic execution
of Android Framework to finding bugs and generating exploits.
Several challenges have been raised by the task. (1) The informa-
tion of an app flows to Android Framework in multiple intricate
steps, making it difficult to identify symbolic inputs. (2) Android
Framework has a complex initialization phase, which exacerbates
the state space explosion problem. (3) A straightforward design
that builds the symbolic executor as a layer inside the Android
system will not work well: not only does the implementation
have to ensure the compatibility with the Android system, but
it needs to be maintained whenever Android gets updated. We
present novel ideas and techniques to resolve the challenges, and
have built the first system for symbolic execution of Android
Framework. It fundamentally changes the state of the art in
exploit generation on the Android system, and has been applied
to constructing new techniques for finding vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Android Framework (aka, Android Application Framework)
contains a set of system services, managing system resources
and life cycles of applications [23]. Recently, many vulnera-
bilities in Android Framework have been identified [15], [16],
[18], [17]. Vulnerabilities in Android Framework can cause
severe security consequences; e.g., malicious apps can exploit
them to steal user passwords, take pictures in the background,
launch UI spoofing attacks, and tamper with user data [36],
[39], [40]. On the other hand, due to Android fragmentation
among the 1.4 billion active devices [42], tens of millions of
Android devices are left unpatched, “turning devices into a
toxic hellstew of vulnerabilities” [1]. Given the severe security
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consequences and the large number of vulnerable Android
devices, attackers are certainly motivated to exploit Android
Framework vulnerabilities.
So far, such exploits have been mainly crafted manually;1
attackers need to go through the complex logic of Android
Framework to figure out the exploit, which is a challenging,
laborious, and lengthy process. Previous researches have shown
the feasibility of automatic exploit generation, but mostly deem
Windows or Unix stand-alone executables to be victims [7],
[6]. (Certainly, once an exploit succeeds, e.g., in hijacking the
control flow of the victim executable, the payload may further
target other victims; how to construct a payload is beyond the
scope of this paper.)
There has been no previous work that automatically
generates exploits taking advantage of Android Framework
vulnerabilities. Such an exploit is embedded inside a malicious
app and may target another app. The exploit generation thus
has to consider multiple entities: the malicious app, the system
services in Android Framework, and the victim app. For
example, in order to launch a task hijacking attack [36], which
seeks to place a malicious activity in the back stack where the
victim activity resides, the malicious app invokes the Activity
Manager Service, which further communicates with a set of
other system services and finally adds the malicious activity to
the back stack hosting the victim activity.2 A new family of
Android Framework specific problems have to be investigated
and dealt with, e.g., how to handle the interaction between
system services, how the states of apps are represented in
Android Framework. Therefore, it will not work out by porting
an existing exploit generation system that targets stand-alone
executables to Android for exploit generation.
In addition, existing techniques typically generate exploits
as some simple form of inputs of stand-alone executables, such
as a command line argument, a format string, a network packet,
1Exceptions exist; e.g., fuzzing has been used for revealing input validation
bugs in Android Framework [31], [11]; the bug-revealing inputs can be used
to launch DoS attacks trivially. We consider general types of vulnerabilities.
2The malicious activity can then be used to conduct, e.g., UI spoofing.
a piece of file metadata, etc. In contrast, the exploit we consider
here is part of a malicious app, and comprises the malicious
app’s configuration (i.e., the manifest file) and code that issues
system service calls. This is another reason why existing exploit
generation techniques are not applicable here.
This work aims at automatic generation of exploits that
take advantage of Android Framework vulnerabilities. It has
multiple security implications. First, it advances the state of the
art in exploit generation on the Android system, and upgrades
attackers’ capabilities of crafting zero-day exploits. With the
large number of automatically generated exploits, even after
an exploit is well known and suppressed, it will be trivial
for attackers to roll out fresh exploits. This calls for a better
understanding of attackers’ capabilities and more powerful
defense against such exploits. Second, it can be applied to
defense systems. For instance, the generated exploits can be
fed into automated malware signature generation algorithms by
defenders without seeing real-life malware [6], [14]. Third, as
shown in our evaluation, the techniques proposed in this work
can be used to find Android Framework vulnerabilities.
An Android Framework vulnerability is exploited usually
because some security property Ps is violated. For example, a
vulnerability due to insufficient permission checking is exploited
if the property that “the target resource can only be accessed
with proper permission” is violated; a task hijacking attack
succeeds when the security property that “the malicious activity
should not be placed onto the back stack hosting the victim
activity” is broken. Thus, among all possible execution paths (of
Android Framework), we apply symbolic execution to searching
for paths where a given Ps can be violated; if such a path
exists, a suspected vulnerability is found and the corresponding
path condition may be used to construct exploits. The exploits
then can be used to validate the suspected vulnerability.
Challenges Several challenges are raised by symbolic
execution of Android Framework for exploit generation.
First, Android Framework hosts a set of system services
serving all apps; thus, it has a large number of data structures
that store the information of the different entities (system
services and apps), e.g., a list that stores the permissions granted
to the installed apps, and stacks that store activities of different
apps. From the perspective of exploit generation, a vital step
is to correctly identify which variables are derived from the
malicious app and specify them as symbolic inputs (since this
means the variables may be manipulable by attackers), such that
all possible values of these variables can be considered by path
exploration. However, it is challenging to determine, among the
numerous variables in Android Framework, which have been
derived from the malicious app. Previous work [19], [4] applies
tainting to revealing whether taints originated from specific
sources (e.g., return values of some system calls in the app)
may propagate to specific sinks. But no previous work has been
done for comprehensively tracking the information flow from
a whole app to the underlying system services. Such tracking
is very difficult, if not impossible, as the information spreads
throughout app installation, system service initialization, and
starting the app. Considering the complexity of these steps, a
precise tainting is very hard to achieve, as it requires enormous
work for handling overtainting and undertainting [37].
This is a unique challenge, because, as aforementioned,
previous exploit generation techniques usually create exploits as
a simple form of inputs, and the variables corresponding to the
inputs, such as a command line argument and a network packet,
are easy to identify. But the exploit we consider here is part of
an app comprising configuration and code, and the information
flow from the app to Android Framework is complex. This
renders the identification of symbolic inputs difficult.
Second, as Android Framework has a very complex
initialization phase, the whole-program symbolic execution
that starts from the main function of Android Framework
can lead to severe state space explosion. An alternative to
the whole-program symbolic execution is under-constrained
symbolic execution [34], [20], [35], which can start from
an arbitrary function within the program and thus allows
previously-unreachable code to be checked. Nevertheless, as
it skips the initialization phase, the execution context (e.g.,
the type and value information of variables) that could have
been provided by the initialization is missing. For example,
consider a virtual function call r.foo, where r is a reference
of an interface or abstract class type; as the real type of the
object pointed to by r is unknown, path exploration virtually
considers r as a symbolic input and has to explore each of
the possible dispatch targets of the call, while only one target
would be explored if the type information were provided. This
causes many spurious paths to be explored, and even renders
the symbolic execution of programs that contain many virtual
function calls intractable.
Previous work seeks to resolve this problem by running
concrete execution first and then switching to symbolic execu-
tion when, e.g., some function of interest is invoked [32]. It
utilizes the execution context generated by concrete execution
for symbolic execution, which is a promising direction. Never-
theless, the path exploration is severely limited in the previous
work, because all variables inside the context are regarded as
concrete inputs (even though some of them should be symbolic
iputs); we call it over-constrained symbolic execution. How to
properly leverage concrete execution for symbolic execution is
still an open research problem.
Third, to implement the symbolic executor, a straightforward
design is to place it inside the Android system. But this way
the symbolic executor is tightly coupled with Android. The im-
plementation has to handle compatibility with the components
of the Android system, such as the Android Runtime (ART).
This significantly complicates the implementation. Moreover,
whenever the Android system is updated, the implementation
has to be maintained. To avoid the complicated implementation
and endless maintenance, a decoupled architecture is needed.
Finally, in order to implement an exploit generation system,
a large number of engineering issues have to be addressed.
For example, it has to handle class loading and system
bootstrapping, deal with the inter-service communication and
calls to native code, and construct exploits using path conditions.
The process of addressing these engineering issues involves
much innovation as well as tremendous effort.
Approaches Instead of tracking how variables are derived
from a malicious app, we seek to identify them by monitoring
how they are used. Based on the insight into the patterns how
variables in Android Framework are accessed, we propose slim
tainting to capture the access to variables derived from the
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malicious app and identify them as symbolic inputs precisely.
Compared to conventional tainting that usually requires signif-
icant manual effort to handle overtainting and undertainting,
the slim tainting is automatic and precise (Section IV).
We run the initialization phase of Android Framework as
whole-program concrete execution, and then perform symbolic
execution under the context provided by the initialization phase.
This is based on the observation of Android Framework that
it consists of the initialization phase and then the ready-for-
use phase, and the initialization phase is fairly stable among
different runs as long as the system configuration does not vary.
The combination of concrete and symbolic executions avoids
the state space explosion due to the complex initialization and
meanwhile does not lose the execution context (Section III).
To avoid over-constrained symbolic execution, in the execution
context provided by the concrete execution, variables derived
from the malicious app are identified by weaving slim tainting
into symbolic execution, such that these variables are specified
as symbolic inputs just in time during symbolic execution.
An architecture that puts the symbolic executor into the
Android system leads to a coupled implementation. In contrast,
the symbolic executor in our design is placed out of the Android
system, implemented in a way independent from the Android
system components. The novel architecture allows concrete
execution to be run on Android and symbolic execution on the
independent symbolic executor. Now, the problem is reduced
to how the symbolic executor recognizes the information in the
execution context provided by concrete execution (Section V).
We have overcome the scientific and engineering challenges,
and implemented the system named CENTAUR. We utilize
CENTAUR to construct new bug finding techniques. Given a
security property Ps, CENTAUR automatically finds possible
paths in Android Framework where Ps may be violated: the
violation of Ps is represented as a constraint added to each path
condition, and if the augmented path condition is resolvable, a
possible vulnerability is found. The new bug finding techniques
are automatic and guarantee zero false positives, in contrast
with recent research on finding Android Framework bugs that
requires laborious and error-prone manual work [39], [36].
Besides, CENTAUR generates hundreds of exploits in minutes,
and the exploits are verified on different versions of Android
systems. We report our new findings on bugs, exploiting
conditions, and more accurate vulnerability description.
• CENTAUR is the first system that performs automatic gener-
ation of exploits that take advantage of Android Framework
vulnerabilities, and the first system that supports symbolic
execution of Android Framework. It significantly changes
the state of the art in finding Android Framework bugs
and exploiting them.
• Unique challenges that cannot be resolved by exist-
ing symbolic execution techniques have been identified;
specifically, how to identify symbolic inputs given a
complex information flow from an app, how to leverage
concrete execution without leading to over-constrained
symbolic execution, and how to design a symbolic executor
decoupled from the target system.
• We present novel ideas and techniques to address the
challenges in the context of Android Framework, such
as a new approach to combining concrete execution and
symbolic execution, and an architecture that decouples the
symbolic executor from the target system.
• We have implemented CENTAUR after overcoming many
research and engineering challenges, and evaluated it in
terms of effectiveness and precision.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
A. Background
Android Framework provides a collection of system services,
which implements the fundamental features within Android,
such as managing the life cycle of all apps, organizing activities
into tasks, and managing app packages. Most of the system
services, except for the media services, run as threads in the
System Server process [23]. Thus, the System Server process
plays a central role in Android Framework. This work uses the
services in this process as examples to illustrate the ideas and
techniques, which should be applicable to other services.
A service exposes service interfaces, which are APIs
invokable from apps, by declaring them in an Android Interface
Definition Language (AIDL) file [2]. When an app invokes
a service API, the call is passed through the IPC mechanism
Binder and handled by the process hosting the service.
B. Overview
Given a specific security property Ps, a malicious app
invokes one of the service interfaces to drive the Android
Framework execution to violate Ps. Therefore, exploit genera-
tion leads to three questions: Which service interfaces should
be invoked? What conditions in terms of the parameter values
and the app configuration should be satisfied, such that the
invocation leads to a successful exploitation? How to build
a malicious app based on the conditions? The questions are
resolved by the following three steps, respectively.
The service interface method that should be invoked to
launch an attack is called the attack’s entrypoint service
interface. Given Ps, it is usually straightforward to determine
the entrypoint service interface for launching the attack. For
example, if the violation of Ps refers to that a service interface
method accesses some resource without sufficient permissions,
then this service interface is the entrypoint one. In addition
to making using of API specification and expert knowledge,
static analysis can also be used to determine the entrypoint.
For example, assume that a DoS attack is launched by raising
unhandled exceptions from some internal method, then service
interfaces that can reach the internal method are entrypoints.
Thus, the selection of the entrypoint mainly depends on the
attack, and we will discuss this step when concrete attacks are
considered in the evaluation (Section VII). We do not bind
our system to any specific selection methods. The second step
is to obtain the app configuration values and the parameter
values used to invoke the entrypoint service interface. Our
approach is to utilize symbolic execution to find such input
values, which is the focus of this paper. Finally, the values
obtained at the second step are used to build exploits. Our
evaluation demonstrates how to build exploits from the values.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of CENTAUR. At its core
is the symbolic execution engine, which performs symbolic
execution of Android Framework. The output is used to build
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Fig. 1. Architecture of CENTAUR.
exploits. Between the engine and the Android system is the
execution context query server, which migrates the execution
context information from Android to the engine. The details
will be described in the following sections.
C. Skeleton Malicious App
There is a dilemma that we are in the process of completing
a malicious app, while the malicious app has to get launched so
that we can identify variables in Android Framework derived
from the app. But how to launch a malicious app that has
not been completed? Our insight is that, due to the nature of
symbolic execution, the concrete values of symbolic inputs do
not matter (detailed in Section IV); hence, a skeleton malicious
app (skeleton app, for short) that works as a placeholder suffices.
The skeleton app can be an app selected to carry the exploit.
We assume that the skeleton app is specified or provided by
users of our system (i.e., malware developers). Or, for security
analysts’ purpose, it can be one that contains all the aspects
of a regular app, including the manifest file, activities, and
services, but does not implement any essential functionality; in
particular, the skeleton app used in our experiments borrows
the manifest file from the Android developer website, which
has “every element that it can contain” [3].
III. COMBINING CONCRETE & SYMBOLIC EXECUTIONS
A. Missing Execution Context
Android Framework has a complex initialization phase
before system services are ready for use. However, symbolic
execution suffers from the path explosion problem, as the
number of distinct execution paths is often exponential in the
number of branches. Thus, symbolic execution starting from the
program entry of Android Framework SystemServer.main
probably fails to finish the initialization phase. Besides, the
initialization creates multiple threads for running services,
which also complicates the symbolic execution. Therefore,
symbolic execution that can skip the complex initialization
phase is desirable.
Definition 1: An execution context consists of the program
counter, register file, stack, and heap. For a Java program, the
heap is a collection of classes and objects.
Under-constrained symbolic execution can directly start
from an arbitrary function within a program [34]. As it
effectively skips the costly initialization phase, this approach
reduces the number and length of execution paths to be
explored. However, due to skipping the functions in the
path prefix, the execution context for symbolic execution is
missing. Specifically, the type and value information of the
input variables, i.e., non-locally defined variables read during
symbolic execution, is lost. It causes several problems.
First, without the type information, it is hard to determine
the dispatch target of a virtual function call. Consider an
example s.iterator(), where s is a reference of the Set
interface type. But Set is implemented by over 40 subclasses in
Android Framework code, which means that symbolic execution
needs to try each possibility, causing many spurious paths to
be explored. Note that such virtual function calls prevail in
Android Framework.
Second, due to the lack of the value information of
variables, it is unknown how to handle instructions or
function calls that involve them. For example, consider
LocationManagerService.mProviders, which is an
ArrayList that stores currently installed GPS providers; as the
elements and the length of the ArrayList are unknown, it is
hard to carry out a loop that iterates through the list. One
workaround is to regard the list as a symbolic input and then
handle it using lazy initialization [28]; this way, however, the
loop becomes unbounded and elements of the list become
symbolic, which exacerbates the path explosion problem.
B. Solution
Our observation of Android Framework is that its execution
consists of the initialization phase and the ready-for-use phase,
and the initialization phase is fairly stable among different runs,
since the system boots according to the system configuration
and the currently installed apps, which are stable. We thus run
the initialization phase as whole-program concrete execution,
and then perform symbolic execution starting at the entrypoint
service interface method under the execution context provided
by the concrete execution. It is notable that the type and value
information of all the variables is available, which directly
resolves the issues discussed in Section III-A. The combination
of concrete and symbolic executions avoids the state space
explosion due to the complex initialization, and meanwhile
preserves the execution context for symbolic execution.
For the purpose of exploit generation, the initialization phase
refers to both the system initialization and the initialization
of the skeleton malicious app until it is ready to make calls
to the entrypoint service interface method, such that Android
Framework has all the variables derived from the skeleton app
that can possibly be used by the service interface call.
However, the concrete execution leaves an execution context
where every variable is concrete, including those derived from
the skeleton app. How to perform symbolic execution in this
situation? Previous work that switches from concrete execution
to symbolic execution simply uses the concrete values of
the variables in the execution context and only considers the
parameters of the function-under-test as symbolic inputs [32],
which severely limits path exploration and leads to over-
constrained symbolic execution. Unlike the previous work, we
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identify variables derived from the skeleton app as symbolic
inputs, such that the path exploration considers all possible
values of the variables, as presented in the next section.
IV. IDENTIFYING SYMBOLIC INPUTS
When symbolic execution is applied to exploit generation
targeting stand-alone executables, the form of exploits is usually
simple, e.g., the SQL query string used to launch SQL injection
attacks and the http request used to exploit a buffer overflow
bug in a web service. Variables corresponding to these exploit
inputs are usually easy to identify. In our case, however, given
the complex information flow from the skeleton app to Android
Framework, it is difficult to identify which variables in the
execution context have been derived from the skeleton app
(Section IV-A). We describe some straightforward thoughts
on solving the problem (Section IV-B), and then present an
automated and precise solution (Section IV-C).
A. Scattered Symbolic Inputs
Android Framework provides a running environment for
all apps, each of which has information stored in Android
Framework, such as granted permissions, activities, and intents.
There are also variables allocated for system services. The
variables used to store the information of different apps and
system services are mixed together in the memory address space,
and there is no clear boundary between variables derived from
the skeleton app and other variables.
A closer look at the Android Framework design
shows that there are two distinct types of variables. The
first type, called non-app-specific variables, includes those
that are allocated and maintained regardless of specific
apps in the system. For example, the aforementioned
LocationManagerService.mProviders ArrayList is
maintained regardless of specific apps. As another example,
AudioService.mConnectedDevices is a HashMap that
stores currently connected devices and does not depend on
specific apps either. There are many other variables belonging
to this type; for instance, a set of field variables (mState,
mNetworkType, mTypeName, etc.) in the NetworkInfo
class that describe the statuses of a network interface. Non-
app-specific variables should be used as concrete inputs rather
than symbolic ones, as a malicious app typically does not have
the capability of manipulating such system data.
The second type, called app-specific variables, stores app-
specific information. Some variables store information for all
the installed apps; for instance, Settings.mUserIds is
an ArrayList that stores the installation data of each installed
app (the code path, signature, first install time, last update
time, granted permissions, etc.). Others store the information of
running apps, such as task affinities, intents, and back stacks.
Unlike the Linux kernel, which stores most information of a
process in a centralized structure task_struct, it is notable
that the app-specific information is organized according to the
system services (rather than apps) probably because Android
Framework is programmed as a set of system service classes.
Given an app, its related information scatters in many different
collection data structures in Android Framework.
The task of selecting symbolic inputs is to find the app-
specific variables and to locate elements derived from the
skeleton app within the variables. E.g., in addition to determin-
ing Settings.mUserIds is an app-specific variable, we
need to locate which element in the array is derived from the
skeleton app, like looking for a needle in a large pile of hay.
B. Thoughts on Tainting
Tainting is a natural approach that may be used to track
the information flow from the skeleton app. By specifying all
the return values of function calls that read the apk file of the
skeleton app as the taint source, all the tainted variables in the
execution context must have been derived from the skeleton
app. However, such information flow involves multiple intricate
steps, including app installation, system boot, and starting the
app. Specifically, after an app is installed, its code and data are
stored into multiple files in the system, which are parsed and
read at different stages during booting the system and starting
the app.
Given the complexity of these steps, it is very unlikely
to precisely tracking the information flow throughout these
complex steps. First, without taint sanitization, more and more
values would become tainted, which results in overtainting [37].
How to insert sanitization properly has been a challenging
problem, especially considering the codebase and complex logic
of the Android system. In addition, undertainting can arise,
for example, when information flow occurs through control
dependencies, tainting based on data flow only is inadequate
and needs dedicated handling. Therefore, a comprehensive and
precise tracking of the information from the skeleton app is
hard to achieve.
C. Slim Tainting for Identifying Symbolic Inputs
1) Locating the Needles: Our investigation of Android
Framework reveals that app-specific variables are stored in
two categories of data structures: array-based ones (built-
in arrays, ArrayList, SparseArray, etc.) and hash-table-based
ones (HashMap, HashSet, etc.). Given an app, the app’s
corresponding element from an app-specific data structure is
retrieved in one of the two characteristic ways.
First, given an array-based variable, the Android Framework
program retrieves an app’s information in the array using an
index that is a function of the app’s UID (an app’s UID is
assigned upon installation and not changed). Our investigation
shows that there are only two such formulas used to calculate
the index. One is (uid%100, 000−10, 000), converting the user
app’s UID into an index to retrieve the element for the app from
a built-in array or ArrayList; the other one is (uid%100, 000),
which is used to calculate the index into a SparseArray. For
example, as shown in Figure 2, the first formula is utilized to
calculate the index into the ArrayList Settings.mUserIds,
which stores the information of all the installed apps with one
element for each app.
Second, for hash-table-based variables, the package name
(or the package name concatenated with a component name)
is used as the key to access elements. Figure 3 shows such an
example. Since the skeleton app has a unique UID and package
name, they are used as taint sources to track the access to
variables derived from the skeleton app.
Given the execution context provided by the concrete
execution, we seek to identify variables derived from the
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Fig. 2. Example of retrieving information from an array-based variable.
1 // static final int PER_USER_RANGE = 100000;
2 // static final int FIRST_APPLICATION_UID = 10000;
3
4 // Defined in the PackageManagerService class
5 // The caller first sets "uid = Binder.
getCallingUid();"
6 int checkUidPermission(String permName, int uid){
7 r = mSettings.getUserIdLPr(UserHandle.getAppId(uid
));
8 ...
9 }
10 // Defined in the UserHandle class
11 static final int getAppId(int uid) {
12 return uid % PER_USER_RANGE;
13 }
14 // Defined in the Settings class
15 ArrayList<Object> mUserIds;
16 Object getUserIdLPr(int uid) {
17 if (uid >= Process.FIRST_APPLICATION_UID) {
18 int index = uid - Process.FIRST_APPLICATION_UID;
19 ...
20 //index = uid%100,000-10,000
21 return mUserIds.get(index);
22 }
23 }
Fig. 3. Example of retrieving information from a hash-table-based variable.
1 // Defined in the PackageManagerService class
2 HashMap<String, PackageParser.Package> mPackages;
3 int checkPermission(String perm, String pkgName){
4 PackageParser.Package p = mPackages.get(pkgName);
5 ...
6 }
skeleton app, and specify them as symbolic inputs. To achieve
it, slim tainting is proposed to recognize the characteristic
access patterns discussed above, and the tainting is weaved
into symbolic execution to specify the identified variables as
symbolic inputs just in time. Specifically, the return value of
getCallingUID and the package name of the skeleton app
are set as taint sources. The taints propagate through (1) the
modular and subtraction operations on the UID, and (2) the
string assignment and concatenation operations involving the
package name. The taint sinks include the get functions of
the collection data structures as well as bytecode instructions
for loading elements from built-in arrays, such as iaload and
aaload, which check whether the index or key being used
has been tainted; if so, the corresponding element is set as a
symbolic input.
Figure 4 shows two examples. Figure 4a depicts an Ar-
rayList variable mUserIds. The names within the parentheses
are the types of the corresponding variables. Assume the
skeleton app UID is 10,054. Due to dynamic taint propagation,
the calculated index 54 (= (uid%100, 000−10, 000)) is tainted;
hence, the corresponding element in mUserIds is set as a
symbolic input when it is loaded using aaload. Figure 4b
shows a HashMap variable mPackages, which uses package
names as keys. Since the package name of the malicious app
is a taint source, when it is used to retrieve an element from
mPackages, the element is identified as a symbolic input
when it is retrieved using the HashMap’s get function.
[54] 
(PackageSetting)
...
mUserIds
(ArrayList)
...[1]
codePath 
(File)
pkg
(PackageParser.Package)
...
grantedPermission 
(HashSet)
activities 
(ArrayList)
packageName
(String)
receivers 
(ArrayList)
signatures 
(PackageSignatures)
services 
(ArrayList)
[0]
...
[1] ...
...
className 
(String)
info 
(ActivityInfo)
intents 
(ArrayList)
componentName 
(ComponentName)
[0]
(a) ArrayList mUserIds using (uid%100, 000− 10, 000) as indexes.
key 
(String)
...
mPackages
(HashMap)
...
...
activities 
(ArrayList)
packageName
(String)
receivers 
(ArrayList)
services 
(ArrayList)
[0] [1] ...
...
className 
(String)
info 
(ActivityInfo)
intents 
(ArrayList)
componentName 
(ComponentName)
...
value 
(PackageParser.Package)
...
(b) HashMap mPackages using package names as keys.
Fig. 4. Examples of app-specific variables.
Slim tainting involves very specific taint sources and
operations, avoiding the overtainting and undertainting problems
in conventional tainting, and requires no manual effort.
2) Relations between Symbolic Inputs: Android Framework
contains a large number of complex, pointer-rich data struc-
tures. Figure 4 shows such examples. Each element in the
ArrayList (Figure 4a) is a reference to a PackageSetting
instance, which comprises many references to other complex
variables, e.g., a PackageParser.Package class instance;
it is notable that symbolic inputs in both the ArrayList
(Figure 4a) and the HashMap (Figure 4b) point to the same
PackageParser.Package instance directly or indirectly.
Such relations are hard coded in Android Framework, and it
is critical to take the relations into account during symbolic exe-
cution. For example, if the two symbolic input references in Fig-
ure 4 were regarded as independent, then each would be consid-
ered to be pointing to a separate PackageParser.Package
instance; constraints in the path condition that should have
described the single PackageParser.Package instance
would be split to describe two instances, which is incorrect.
Existing symbolic execution techniques have not resolved
the problem of describing the relations between symbolic inputs
automatically. Lazy initialization can be used to synthesize
a data structure, but still relies on manual effort to write
specification about the data structure [28].
To resolve the problem, the concept of semi-symbolic
reference is proposed for handling reference-typed symbolic
inputs. Specifically, let r be a reference that is identified as a
symbolic input through tainting, and o be the object pointed
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to by r. When r is used to access o, the symbolic executor
first examines whether o.symbolicHandled is true, where
symbolicHandled is a flag added to each object indicating
whether the host object has been identified as a symbolic input.
If it is false, all the primitive-typed fields in o are set to
conventional symbolic inputs, while other reference-typed fields
are set to semi-symbolic references (for recursive handling), and
symbolicHandled is set to true; otherwise, no handling
is performed to avoid duplicate processing.
There are several critical points in the solution. First, the
solution benefits from the execution context information: when
two references point to the same object, they have the same
reference value; thus, when an object is processed multiple
times due to multiple references pointing to it, the solution
can recognize that they point to the same object and ensure
the object is identified as a symbolic input only once (based
on the symbolicHandled flag). For example, in Figure 4,
after the PackageParser.Package object is handled once,
its symbolicHandled flag must be true. Second, a semi-
symbolic reference propagates this attribute to all the reference-
typed fields in the object it points to, such that they are handled
recursively. The propagation is valid as in Android Framework
each element in an app-specific data structure is a “cell” that
stores information for a specific app; this design ensures that
once the execution obtains the reference to some element in
an app-specific data structure, the subsequent access is bound
to the information of the app stored in that element without
worries that the access may reach another app’s information.
V. DECOUPLED ARCHITECTURE
By combining concrete execution and symbolic execution,
the state space explosion due to the complex initialization is
avoided, but the hybrid execution idea requires a more careful
design. This section first describes the design choices we made,
and then presents our design.
A. Design Choices
A straightforward design is to augment the Android system
to add the capability of symbolic execution by modifying
Android Runtime (ART). It takes advantage of the ART’s capa-
bility of concrete execution, but requires a lot of modifications
to enable symbolic execution, which is very different from
concrete execution in terms of thread management, garbage
collection, object representation, instruction execution, etc.
Therefore, it is challenging to make the two types of execution
coexist in the same system. Not only does the compatibility
with concrete execution have to be handled carefully, but it
implies endless effort to maintain the implementation for the
frequently updated Android system.
Instead of implementing a coupled system, we propose
to allocate the two kinds of executions to two systems:
an original Android system for concrete execution and the
other system outside Android for symbolic execution. As the
latter is specialized for symbolic execution, its design and
implementation are largely simplified. Moreover, since the
symbolic execution engine is decoupled from the Android
system, it does not need to be maintained when the Android
system is updated.
Algorithm 1 Migration of heap information.
1: function GETFIELD(index)
2: objRef = peekStackTop()
3: fdInfo = getFdInfo(index) ⊲ Class-specific info.
4: fd = getFd(objRef, fdInfo) ⊲ objRef -specific info.
5: if !fd.getSnapshotRefAttribute() then
6: return super.getfield(index)
7: end if
8: concRef = fd.getValue()
9: symRef = conc2Sym.get(concRef)
10: if symRef == NULL then
11: fdType = fdInfo.getFdType()
12: if fdType == strRef then
13: str = snapshot.getStr(concRef)
14: symRef = searchConstantPool(str);
15: if symRef == NULL then
16: symRef = newString(str);
17: end if
18: else if fdType == arrayRef then
19: entryType = fdType.getEntryType()
20: len = snapshot.getArrayLen(concRef)
21: symRef = newArray(entryType, len)
22: snapshot.copyEntries(symRef, concRef)
23: else ⊲ Other reference types
24: symRef = newObj(fdType)
25: snapshot.copyFields(symRef, concRef)
26: end if
27: conc2Sym.addPair(concRef, symRef)
28: end if
29: fd.setValue(symRef)
30: fd.setSnapshotRefAttribute(false)
31: return super.getfield(index)
32: end function
33:
34: function INITCLASS(classInfo)
35: if snapshot.isInitialized(classInfo) then
36: snapshot.copyStaticFields(classInfo)
37: else
38: super.initClass(classInfo)
39: handleBootstrapField(classInfo)
40: end if
41: end function
TABLE I. BYTECODE INSTRUCTIONS (AND FUNCTION) USED FOR
MIGRATING HEAP INFORMATION.
Instruction
Stack
Description
[before]→[after]
getfield objRef → value get a field value of an object
getstatic →value get a static field value of a class
aaload
arrayRef, index load onto the stack a reference
→ value from an array
initClass N/A invoked for class initialization
B. Migration Algorithm
Symbolic execution is launched by executing a driver
program that invokes an entrypoint system interface method.
Upon starting, the program counter, register file, and stack all
obtain their fresh content, while the heap, which is a collection
of classes and objects, needs to be migrated from the execution
context provided by the concrete execution.
The heap memory image in the execution context provided
by the concrete execution is called a snapshot. We present an
algorithm that migrates classes and objects from the snapshot
to the JVM for symbolic execution. Whenever a class or object
7
is referenced, it is migrated from the snapshot by allocating
space in the symbolic executor and then copying the fields.
The algorithm is built into the symbolic execution engine,
which interprets the Java bytecode (of Android Framework) in
a non-standard way. Algorithm 1 shows the main migration pro-
cedures, which override the interpretation of several bytecode
instructions. Table I shows the list of bytecode instructions
whose interpretation is overridden to support migration; for each
instruction, the effect that the instruction has on the operand
stack and the description are included. We first introduce a
data structure and a flag that are important for migration, and
then describe how objects and classes are migrated.
Migration hash table. A hash table, conc2Sym, is maintained
to map reference values in the concrete execution world (where
the snapshot has been captured) to ones in the symbolic
execution world. Every time an object o is migrated, a new pair
〈rc, rs〉 is added to the hash table, where rc is the reference
value of o in the concrete execution world and rs symbolic.
The hash table is maintained for two purposes. First, it prevents
duplicate migration of an object; that is, an object pointed to
by rc is migrated only if rc is not found in the hash table.
Second, the hash table is used to translate reference values in
the concrete execution world, if they exist in the hash table, to
ones in the symbolic execution world. The hash table is handled
as part of the process state, and gets stored and restored as the
path exploration advances and backtracks, respectively.
Reference flag. A flag snapshotRef is associated with each
reference-typed field (and each reference-typed element in an
array, as well) by the symbolic executor to indicate whether its
value is a reference value in the concrete execution world. When
an object is newly migrated, the snapshotRef flags of all its
reference-typed fields (and elements in an array object) are set
to true, since the field values only make sense in the concrete
execution world. Once a field is updated with a reference value
in the symbolic execution world, its snapshotRef is set to
false.
Migrating objects. Given a reference to an object on
the stack (Line 2), the instruction getfield pushes a
field value of the object onto the stack. If the field’s
snapshotRef attribute is false (Line 5; note that, for
all primitive-typed fields, getSnapshotRefAttribute
returns false), which means that either it is a primitive-
typed field or it has a reference value in the symbolic
execution world, the instruction’s interpretation is not changed.
If snapshotRef is true and the field value concRef is not
found in conc2Sym (Line 10), the object should be migrated
(Lines 11–26); after migration, the pair 〈concRef, symRef〉
is added to conc2Sym (Line 27).
How to migrate an object is determined by the object type
(Line 11). (1) If the object is a string, the algorithm first
searches for a string that has the same value within the runtime
constant pool (which stores a set of string literals) in the
VM for symbolic execution. If not found, a new string with
the same value is created in the symbolic world (Lines 12–
17). (2) If the object is an array, an array is allocated and
all the elements are copied to the new array (Lines 18–22).
This algorithm performs a shallow copy. Thus, for a multi-
dimensional array, e.g., A[5][10], only the 5 elements in the
top-level array are copied at this moment. Later, to access any
of the 5 elements, the instruction aaload is executed, which
Fig. 5. Example of a test driver.
1 public TestDriver() {
2 @fromSnapshot
3 private static com.android.server.
LocationManagerService mService;
4 public static void main() {
5 // The parameters are configured as symbolic
inputs, so their values do not matter
6 mService.getProviders(null, false);
7 }
8 }
is the reason the interpretation of aaload is also overridden
to migrate second-level arrays (not shown in Algorithm 1).
This reflects the principle of lazy migration: an array object
is not copied until a reference to the object is accessed. (3) A
reference to an ordinary object is handled by allocating a new
object and copying all its fields (Lines 23–25).
While non-static fields are accessed through getfield,
access to static fields is through getstatic. Thus, to
migrate objects pointed to by static fields, the interpretation
of getstatic has to be overridden, and the interpretation is
similar to that of getfield.
Migrating classes. When an operation (e.g., an object of a
class is created or a class’s static fields are accessed for the
first time) triggers initialization of a class during symbolic
execution, initClass is invoked by the underlying VM for
symbolic execution automatically. For classes that have been
initialized during concrete execution, the symbolic executor has
to make sure that they are migrated instead of being initialized,
considering that the static fields have obtained their values
during concrete execution. Thus, when initClass is invoked,
the symbolic executor first checks whether the class has been
initialized in the concrete execution world; if so, the enclosed
static fields in the class are copied from the snapshot to the
symbolic execution world (Line 36). In particular, when an
object of some class is created in the symbolic world for the
first time due to migration (Line 24), it triggers the invocation
of initClass first, which migrates the class.
C. Bootstrapping
An important invariant kept during migration is that,
whenever a field of an object o (resp. an element of an
array A) is accessed, o (resp. A) must have existed in the
symbolic execution world. The invariant is achieved because,
upon accessing a reference-typed field, the object pointed to
by the field gets migrated. Assume f is the field whose access
triggers the migration of the first object; a natural question is
where f resides. This question is resolved in the test driver.
A test driver simply invokes the entrypoint system interface
method and specifies the bootstrap field, whose type is
a reference to the system service class that contains the
entrypoint method. Figure 5 shows an example of a test
driver. A custom annotation fromSnapshot is used to
specify the bootstrap field, which is recognized and han-
dled by handleBootstrapField (Line 39 in Algorithm
1), when the TestDriver class is initialized; specifically,
handleBootstrapField sets the bootstrap field value
to the reference value of the system service object in the
concrete execution world, and sets the field’s snapshotRef
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attribute to true. (Note that all the system service classes adopt
the singleton design pattern, so there is no ambiguity when
specifying the reference value.) In Figure 5, for example, when
TestDriver is initialized, handleBootstrapField sets
the bootstrap field to the reference to the Location Manager
service object in the snapshot. Next, when the bootstrap field
is accessed, the service object is migrated.
D. Migration Tree
The migration of classes and objects forms a migration
tree, which grows as new classes and objects are migrated,
rooted at the class and object corresponding to the bootstrap
field type. We use the test driver in Figure 5 as an example
to illustrate how the migration tree is built, as shown in
Figure 6, where the root node is the class and object for
LocationManagerService. The migration of a class also
triggers the migration of all its super classes, which is not
shown in Figure 6 for simplicity.
Part of the resulted migration tree is showed in Figure 7. It
also shows the identified symbolic inputs and how the symbolic
input attribute propagates. After the element with index 54 in the
mUserIds is identified as a symbolic input through tainting,
the symbolic input attribute is propagated to other variables
pointed to by the element.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We built the symbolic executor on Symbolic PathFinder
(SPF) [33], a symbolic execution framework on top of the
Java PathFinder (JPF) [41]. It runs outside the Android system,
and does not rely on the Android internals, achieving the goal
of a decoupled architecture. This section covers important
implementation details for building and configuring the system.
A. Configuration
In addition to specifying the entrypoint system interface
and the test driver, we need to provide the Android Framework
code and the heap memory snapshot for symbolic execution.
1) Classpath: The Java source code in Android is compiled
into .jar files, which comprise standard .class files, and
the symbolic executor is built to analyze Java bytecode in such
.class files. The classpath below shows the classes analyzed
by the symbolic executor.
classpath=test_driver_dir;\
services_intermediates/classes-full-debug.jar;\
framework_intermeidates/classes-full-debug.jar;\
core-libart_intermediates/classes-full-debug.jar
The first line specifies the directory containing the test
driver, the next two lines the Android Framework code, and
the last line the core libraries of ART, such as utility, io,
and math libraries. Several classes (e.g., java.lang.class,
.Thread, .StackTraceElement) are modeled by the
symbolic executor, but core-libart contains the Android
version of these classes; they are hence excluded from
core-libart to avoid system initialization failures.
Fig. 8. A service call in Android Framework.
1 public class LocationManagerService {
2 private UserManager mUserManager;
3 void updateUserProfiles(int currentUserId) {
4 List<UserInfo> profiles = mUserManager.
getProfiles(currentUserId);
5 }
6 ...
7 }
8 public class UserManager {
9 private final IUserManager mService;
10 public List<UserInfo> getProfiles(int uHandle) {
11 mService.getProfiles(uHandle, false);
12 }
13 ...
14 }
2) Heap Memory Snapshot: After a heap memory snapshot
of the System Server process is captured (using the dumpheap
utility), it is first converted to a standard .hprof file using
the hprof-conv utility included in the Android SDK. The
standard .hprof file format opens up the possibility of parsing
the snapshot using many existing tools and utilities. In our case,
a HPROF heap dump parser is used to extract the list of classes
and objects stored in the .hprof file [26]. Based on the parser,
we have built an execution context query server that returns
classes and objects requested by the symbolic executor.
B. Handling Special calls
1) Handling Service Calls: Service calls are frequently used
among services. While inter-process service calls are made
through the intricate Binder IPC mechanism, intra-process calls
are actually ordinary method calls. Figure 8 shows an example,
where the Location Manager service invokes getProfiles
exposed by the User Manager service; both services belong
to the System Server process. The call at Line 4 leads to a
service call at Line 11, which is a virtual function call, whose
dispatch relies on the runtime type of the object pointed to
by UserManager.mservice. Previous research relies on
expert knowledge and specifies the dispatch targets manually to
facilitate further analysis [39], [12], [5], while CENTAUR makes
use of the runtime type information provided by the execution
context, and thus the call is handled as an ordinary virtual
function call without requiring expert knowledge or manual
effort. This is a concrete example illustrating the advantage of
combining concrete and symbolic executions.
2) Dealing with Handler and State Machine Calls: Two
other important IPC mechanisms that are widely used by system
services are Message Handler and State Machine calls. A
handler sends and processes messages associated with a thread’s
message queue [25]. When a new handler is created, it is bound
to the message queue of the thread that creates it. From that
point on, it will deliver messages to that message queue and ex-
ecute them as they come out of the message queue. To deal with
Message Handler calls, when sendMessage(message) is
invoked, the invocation is replaced by that of the correspond-
ing Handler’s handleMessage(message). The symbolic
executor interposes the invokevirtual instruction and
enforces the replacement on the fly.
A State Machine can also send and process messages,
which has states arranged hierarchically. A state is an instance
of the State class, which implements processMessage
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(1) Access to the bootstrap field TestDriver.mService first 
triggers the migration of the LocationManagerService 
class; the migration is performed in initClass().
(2) This access then triggers the migration of the 
LocationManagerService object pointed to by the 
bootstrap field; the migration is performed in 
getstatic().
(3) Access to the mService.mContext field triggers the 
migration of the object pointed to by mContext, which 
triggers the ContextImpl class to be migrated first; the 
migration is performed in initClass().
(4) Next, the object pointed to by mContext gets 
migrated; the migration is performed in getfield().
(5) Invocation of the static method getDefault() of the ActivityManagerNative class 
triggers the migration of this class; the migration is performed in initClass().
 mService 
<0x12D8F160, 1336>
LocationManagerService
<0x13068800, 1324>
 mService
<0x12D8F160, 1336>
LocationManagerService
<0x13068800, 1324>
ContextImpl
<0x6FCC52F0, 1355>
 mService
<0x12D8F160, 1336>
LocationManagerService
<0x13068800, 1324>
 mContext
<0x12D45480, 1361>
ContextImpl
<0x6FCC52F0, 1355>
ActivityManagerNative
<0x6FC89368, 1378>
 mService
<0x12D8F160, 1336>
LocationManagerService
<0x13068800, 1324>
 mContext
<0x12D45480, 1361>
ContextImpl
<0x6FCC52F0, 1355>
 Object*
<conRef, symRef>
Class name
<conRef, symRef>
Legend:
LocationManagerService
<0x13068800, 1324>
*Denoted by the name of the 
field that points to the object
Fig. 6. Process for building a migration tree. Grey rectangles and white ones denote classes and objects, respectively. For each class and object, <conRef,
symRef> denotes the mapping between the reference value in the concrete execution world and that in the symbolic world, added to the conc2Sym hash table.
 mService
<0x12D8F160, 1336>
(LocationManagerService)
gDefault
<0x701FD898, 1382> 
(Singleton)
mInstance
<0x12C44800, 1384>
(ActivityManagerService)
sCallIdentity
<0x12D5A1D0, 1385>
(ThreadLocal)
ActivityManagerNative
<0x6FC89368, 1378>
AppGlobals
<0x6FCAA288, 1393>
ActivityManager
<0x6FC87140, 1390>
sPackageManager
<0x12D3D7A0, 1403>
(PackageManagerService)
ActivityThread
<0x6FCA2BB0, 1397>
mSettings
<0x12E91B80, 1410>
(Settings)
mUserIds
<0x12EA6580, 1415>
(ArrayList)
grantedPermissions
<0x12F079D0, 1422>
(HashSet)
backingMap
<0x12F28A30, 1429>
(HashMap)
array
<0x12D04000, 1416>
(Object[])
[54]
<0x12DEDD30, 1419>
(PackageSetting)
[0]
<0x12F2A540, 1432>
(HashMapEntry)
key
<0x70167D70, 1431>
(String)
next = 0
(HashMapEntry)
[0]
<0x12F67A10, 1452>
(PassiveProvider)
[1]
<0x12D3D8C0, 1460>
(GpsLocationProvider)
[2]
<0x1308B550, 1472>
(LocationProviderProxy)
array
<0x12F01AC0, 1449>
(Object[])
mProviders
<0x12E555A0, 1448>
(ArrayList)
PROPERTIES
<0x12F4EF70, 1456>
(ProviderProperties)
PROPERTIES
<0x12F4EFD0, 1464>
(ProviderProperties)
LocationManager
<0x1306D800, 1496>
PASSIVE_PROVIDER
<0x6FE6AE30, 1550>
(String)
GPS_PROVIDER
<0x6FC1FE90, 1551>
(String)
mContext
<0x12D45480, 1361>
(ContextImpl)
mProperties
<0x1315DCD0, 1477>
(ProviderProperties)
mName
<0x6FE62178, 1481>
(String)
getfield
getstatic
aaload
invokestatic
entryForNullKey = 0
(HashMapEntry)
table
<0x12F2A520, 1430>
(HashMapEntry[])
Criteria
<0x13069000, 1492>
Fig. 7. Part of a migration tree with some classes omitted. Different arrows are used to denote different instructions that trigger the migration. Rectangles with
diagonal stripes denote objects that are identified as symbolic inputs.
for handling messages. A State Machine sends a message by
invoking sendMessage. When a State Machine receives a
message, the current state’s processMessage is invoked.
Therefore, a key step is to identify the current state. To
do it, the field mSmHandler in the State Machine object,
which is a reference to the state machine handler, is retrieved
(note that when the State Machine object is migrated, all
its fields are copied), and then used to migrate the state
machine handler object. Next, two fields in the handler
object, mStateStack and mStateStackTopIndex,
are used to identify the current state (=
mStateStack[mStateStackTopIndex].state).
To handle messages sent by a State Machine
in the symbolic executor, the invocation of
mSmHandler.sendMessage(message) is replaced
by that of the current state’s processMessage(message).
This way, we connect the senders and receivers for messages
sent through State Machine.
3) Handling Calls to Native Code: Part of Android
Framework is implemented in native code, which is invoked
through the Java Native Interface (JNI) mechanism. Dif-
ferent ways are adopted to handle JNI calls during sym-
bolic execution. First, methods that return the calling UID
(getCallingUid()) and the package name of the client
app (getPackageName()) are modeled to return the cor-
responding information for the skeleton app constantly, and
the return values are set to be taint sources as aforementioned.
Second, the return values of other native methods that return
app-specific information of the skeleton app are specified as
symbolic inputs. For example, many native methods declared
in the package android.content.res access application
resources. Third, for native methods that do not have return
values they are ignored; ignoring calls to external code has
been used in many symbolic execution techniques [10], [33].
Finally, other calls to native methods are delegated back
to Android as remote procedure calls. The RPC client in the
symbolic executor is built by extending jpf-nhandler [38]. While
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jpf-nhandler delegates native calls to a host JVM, this client
delegates them to an app running as the RPC server in a remote
Android system (Figure 1), which issues delegated native calls
using reflection on demand. The GSON library [24] is used for
marshalling (and unmarshalling) method parameters and return
values, which are transmitted between the RPC server and the
client via socket. Note that though an Android system is used
to execute native calls, the symbolic executor is decoupled
from it using the RPC mechanism.
C. Other Aspects of Symbolic Execution
1) Attributes for Symbolic Execution: JPF supports attributes
to be associated with program values including locals, stack
operands, and class/object fields in the heap. The framework
makes use of attributes to store taints, reference flags, symbolic
input attributes, and symbolic expressions.
2) Overriding Bytecode Interpretation: JPF allows replac-
ing or extending the interpretation of bytecode instructions.
Interpretation classes for instructions, such as getfield,
getstatic, and aaload, are overridden to specify symbolic
inputs and migrate the execution context information.
3) Intercepting Method Calls: JPF provides a mechanism
called Model Java Interface (MJI) that intercepts method
invocations for custom handling. CENTAUR makes use of
MJI to intercept certain method calls (e.g., getCallingUid,
getPackageName, and the get functions of various col-
lection data structures), and redirects them to our custom
implementation of these functions. This mechanism is also
used by the RPC client for intercepting calls to native code.
VII. EVALUATION
A. Experiment Settings and Overview
The experiments were performed on a machine with an
Intel Core i7 4.0Ghz Quad Core processor and 32GB RAM
running Linux kernel 3.13. Exploits were generated on Android
Framework 5.0, and verified using different versions of Android
systems and settings.
We first present two case studies that demonstrate the
applications of CENTAUR. They show two typical scenarios
of applying CENTAUR. The first case study illustrates how
static analysis and symbolic execution are combined to find
vulnerabilities and generate exploits. The second case study
relies on the CENTAUR system only.
Next, the reliability of the approach based on heap mem-
ory snapshots is investigated. We present exploit generation
experiments based on snapshots captured at different times,
and analyze the results.
Finally, we compare symbolic execution used in CENTAUR
against under-constrained symbolic execution (UCSE). Both
can start symbolic execution from system interface methods
instead of the main function to reach the code deep in the
program, but CENTAUR makes use of the execution context
provided by concrete execution to improve the precision and
efficiency of symbolic execution.
B. Case Study 1: Exploiting Inconsistent Security Policy
Enforcement (ISPE)
1) Background: Android Framework utilizes a permission-
based security model, which provides controlled access to
various system resources. However, a sensitive operation may be
reached from different paths, which may enforce security checks
inconsistently. As a result, an attacker with insufficient privilege
may perform sensitive operations by taking paths that lack
security checks. Recently, static analysis combined with manual
code inspection has been applied to finding such inconsistent
security enforcement cases in Android Framework [39]. The
system, called Kratos, first builds a call graph based on the
Android Framework code. With the call graph, it finds all
the execution paths that can reach sensitive operations. Kratos
then compares the paths pairwise to identify paths that reach
the same sensitive operation with inconsistent security checks
enforced, and reports them as suspected ISPE vulnerabilities,
as they violate the security property that all paths should have
consistent permissions for reaching a given sensitive operation.
2) Combined Approach for Bug Finding: While static
analysis is very scalable, it is well known that the analysis
results may be imprecise. In the case of finding ISPE bugs, static
analysis based on the reachability analysis may report false
positives, as some paths may be infeasible in real executions.
Currently, manual effort is used to scrutinize the code along
each reported path, which is laborious and tedious; moreover,
it is difficult to verify the correctness of the manual inspection.
We propose to combine static analysis and symbolic
execution to find ISPE bugs. For each suspected vulnerability
reported by static analysis, CENTAUR (1) finds all feasible paths
that reach the sensitive operation, (2) gives permissions needed
for each feasible path (the needed permissions are included
in each path condition), (3) verifies permission consistency
among the feasible paths, and (4) generates inputs that exercise
the feasible paths to verify suspected vulnerabilities. It thus
demonstrates the applications of CENTAUR comprehensively.
All the steps have been performed automatically, in contrast
with previous work that relies on tedious and error-prone manual
inspection. In addition, zero false positives are guaranteed as all
suspected vulnerabilities are validated by the generated inputs.
Table II summarizes the experiment results (the vulnerability
shown in the last row is discussed in Case Study 2). For
each vulnerability, the table lists the vulnerability description,
entrypoint(s), the min/max number of migrated classes among
different paths, the min/max number of migrated objects among
different paths, the number of sets of concrete values generated
(“—” means it can be exploited unconditionally), the number
of sets that can be used to generate exploits, the symbolic
execution time, whether the suspected vulnerability is really
exploitable, and whether the results are consistent with those
of Kratos.
Given an entrypoint method, there are may be multiple
paths that reach the sensitive operation, and the classes and
objects involved in the paths may vary, as illustrated by the
min/max number of migrated classes and objects. Note that
when migrating a class, all its super classes are also migrated,
which is the reason the number of migrated classes is greater
than that of objects. In the majority of the cases, the symbolic
execution of an entrypoint method is finished within less one
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TABLE II. LIST OF VULNERABILITIES. (LMS, PSB, TSI, PIM, WMS, AMS, WSI, NS, AND ASS REPRESENT LOCATIONMANAGERSERVICE,
PHONESTATEBROADCASTER, TELECOMSERVICEIMPL, PHONEINTERFACEMANAGER, WINDOWMANAGERSERVICE, ACTIVITYMANAGERSERVICE,
WIFISERVICEIMPL, NSDSERVICE, AND ACTIVITYSTACKSUPERVISOR, RESPECTIVELY.)
No.
Vulnerability
Entrypoint(s)
# of # of # of # of Sym.
Exploitable?
Consistent with
description
migrated classes migrated objects all legal exe.
Kratos?
min max min max sets sets time
1
Access
LMS.getAllProviders() 55 55 4 4 — — 14s
✓ ✓installed providers
LMS.getProviders(Criteria,boolean) 77 93 14 42 130 130 1m 28s
with insuf. privilege
2
Read TSI.getCallState() 48 48 3 3 — — 5s
✓ ✓phone state TSI.isInCall() 62 69 17 20 1 1 23s
with insuf. privilege TSI.isRinging() 60 65 16 18 1 1 21s
3
End
TSI.endCall() 81 83 21 24 1 1 18s
✓ ✓phone calls
PIM.endCall() 80 85 23 26 1 1 24s
with insuf. privilege
4
Close
WMS.closeSystemDialogs(String) 57 57 6 6 — — 11s
✓ ✓system dialogs
AMS.closeSystemDialogs(String) 63 67 11 15 2 2 37s
with insuf. privilege
5
Set up HTTP proxy
WSI.addOrUpdateNetwork() 67 122 23 52 18 18 1m 06s
✓ ✗working in PAC mode
WSI.getWifiServiceMessenger() 65 84 21 24 1 1 43s
with insuf. privilege
6
Enable/Disable
NS.setEnabled(boolean) 75 114 28 53 1 1 37s
✓ ✗mDNS daemon
NS.getMessenger() 80 81 11 14 1 1 45s
with insuf. privilege
7
Task hijacking ASS.startActivityUncheckedLocked() 324 387 136 182 2,020 810 14m 33s ✓ N/A
minute. All the cases are verified using the inputs generated
by CENTAUR, showing they are exploitable.
New findings. It is notable that some of our results
are inconsistent with those of Kratos. First, for the fifth
vulnerability in Table II, Kratos reports that it does not
exist in Android Framework 5.0, while CENTAUR shows
that it still exist (i.e., different permissions are required by
the two system interface methods for reaching the sensitive
resource) and the result is verified using inputs generated by
CENTAUR. Second, for the sixth vulnerability in Table II, Kratos
reports only one permission CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL
for invoking NsdService.setEnabled, while CENTAUR
reports two permissions, CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL and
WRITE_SETTINGS. The more thorough and accurate results
demonstrate the advantages of the hybrid approach.
3) A Detailed Example: As an example, we describe
in detail how the combined approach was applied to
finding the first vulnerability in Table II. First, the static
analysis based on path reachability and pairwise path
comparison finds that both getProviders(Criteria,
boolean) and getAllProviders() (in the
LocationManagerService class) have paths reaching the
same sensitive operation that returns the names of the installed
GPS providers, and the two paths can be executed with
inconsistent permissions; thus, it is a suspected vulnerability.
Next, CENTAUR is applied to validating it automatically.
Specifically, after the Android system is initialized and the
skeleton app is launched, a heap memory snapshot of the
System Server process is captured, and provides execution
context for symbolic execution, and symbolic execution starts
from the two service interface methods respectively.
Entrypoint 1: getProviders(Criteria,
boolean). Figure 9 shows the sub-call graph rooted
at this entrypoint with collection and string operations
omitted. It leads to invocation of multiple methods of
other services, e.g., ActivityManagerService and
PackageManagerService. The services run in the same
process, so are handled as ordinary method calls using the
1. LMS.getProviders
2. LMS.getCallerAllowedsolutionLevel
3. Binder.getCallingPid 
4. Binder.getCallingUid 
5. LMS.getAllowedResolutionLevel
6. ContextImpl.checkPermission
7. AMS.checkPermission
8. AMS.checkComponentPermission
9. AM.checkComponentPermission
10. PMS.checkUidPermission
11. Settings.getUserIdLPr
12. LMS.getMinimumResolutionLevelForProviderUse
13. LMS.isAllowedByUserSettingsLocked
14. LMS.isCurrentProfile
15. LMS.isUidALocationProvider
16. LMS.doesUidHavaPackage
1
2
12
31
6 7 8 9 10 11
17. PMS.getPackagesForUid
18. LMS.isAllowedByCurrentUserSettingsLocked
19. Settings.isLocationProviderEnabledForUser
20. Settings.Secure.getStringForUser
21. Settings.Global.getStringForUser
22. Settings.NameValueCache.getStringForUser
23. UserHandle.myUserId
24. Process.myUid
25. Os.getuid
26. Libcore.os.getuid
27. libcore.io.Posix.getuid
28. SystemProperties.getLong
29. SystemProperties.native_get_long
30. TextUtils.delimitedStringContains
31. LMS.propertiesMeetCriteria
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16 17
19
20
30
22
28
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29
23 27
5
24 25
11
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4
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Fig. 9. Sub-call graph rooted at getProviders(Criteria, boolean).
(LMS, AM, AMS, and PMS represent LocationManagerService, ActivityMan-
ager, ActivityManagerService, and PackageManagerService, respectively. The
grey nodes denote native methods.)
runtime type information in the execution context.
Four native methods are involved: getCallingUid,
getCallingPid, getuid, and native_get_long.
Calls to these methods are intercepted using MJI, and are
redirected to our handlers of these methods. The first two
return the UID and PID of the client app, respectively, and
getuid returns the UID = 1000, which is the UID of the
System Server process. The call to native_get_long is
delegated back to the Android system through RPC.
The variable mUserIds.array[54] is identified as a
symbolic input through the tainting during symbolic execu-
tion. Figure 10 shows several examples of the generated
concrete values. Take the first set as an example; it provides
clear information for building an app that exercises the
paths in terms of configuring the app (i.e., requiring the
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission) and preparing the
12
Fig. 10. Examples of concrete input values generated in case study 1.
(mUserIds.array[54].grantedPermissions.backingMap.
table[836059052 & (length_SYM - 1].key_SYM ==
permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION) &&
(criteria != null) &&
(criteria.mHorizontalAccuracy == 2) &&
(criteria.mPowerRequirement == 0) &&
(criteria.mAltitudeRequired == false) &&
(criteria.mSpeedRequired == false) &&
(criteria.mBearingRequired == false) &&
(criteria.mCostAllowed == false)
(enabledOnly = false) &&
//output: ["gps"]
(mUserIds.array[54].grantedPermissions.backingMap.
table[836059052 & (length_SYM - 1].key_SYM ==
permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION) &&
(criteria == null) &&
(enabledOnly = true) &&
//output: ["gps", "passive"]
parameter values (i.e., criteria and enabledOnly) for
invoking the entrypoint method.
Entrypoint 2: getAllProviders(). The generated
path condition is constantly true, which means this method can
be invoked with no permissions needed.
As the needed permissions required by the two entrypoints
differ, it is identified as an ISPE vulnerability. We then checked
the reliability of the exploits. 60 emulators with different
device types, Android framework versions (4.3, 4.4, and 5.0),
and CPU/ABI configurations were used to check whether the
completed apps could access the targeted sensitive resource. The
experiments show that the apps are effective on all the emulators,
as the different configurations among the emulators do not affect
the invocation and execution of the system interface methods.
It demonstrates the reliability of the exploits.
Summary. Compared to previous work that relies on
enormous and error-prone manual inspection, the combined
approach of static analysis and symbolic execution eliminates
the need for manual work and guarantees zero false positives.
It is potential to apply this approach to finding other types of
vulnerabilities in Android Framework.
C. Case Study 2: Constructing Task Hijacking Attacks
1) Background: The Activity Manager Service (AMS)
allows activities of different apps to reside in the same task,
which is a collection of activities that users interact with
when performing a certain job. The activities in a given task
are arranged in a back stack, pushed in the order they were
opened; users can navigate back using the “Back” button. This
feature can be exploited by a malicious app if its activities are
manipulated to reside side by side with the victim apps in the
same task and hijack the user sessions of the victim apps.
This is a design flaw rather than a program bug, and can be
exploited to implement UI spoofing, denial-of-service, and user
monitoring attacks [36]. For example, a malicious app may
start a malicious activity that impersonates the victim activity,
and the UI spoofing attack succeeds if the fake activity resides
in the same back stack as the target victim activity, and the
user may mistake the fake malicious activity for the victim one.
Activity.
startActivity
Activity.
startActivityForResult
Instrumentation.
execStartActivity
Malicious process System Server process
Binder driver
ASS.
startActivityLocked
ASS.
startActivityMayWait
ASS.
startActivityUncheckedLocked
AMS.
startActivity
Fig. 11. The rough procedure of starting an activity. (ASS represents
ActivityStackSupervisor.)
Fig. 12. Function startActivityUncheckedLocked.
final int startActivityUncheckedLocked(
ActivityRecord r, ActivityRecord sourceRecord,
IVoiceInteractionSession voiceSession,
IVoiceInteractor voiceInteractor, int
startFlags, boolean doResume, Bundle options,
TaskRecord inTask) {...}
The security property here is that the malicious activity should
not reside in the same back stack as the target victim activity.
This case illustrates unique characteristics of generating
exploits that take advantage of Android Framework vulnera-
bilities: while the design flaw is due to Android Framework,
the victim entity is not the framework but another app, and the
malicious “input” is not a simple string input but a separate
app. It is very different from exploit generation targeting a
vulnerable executable, which typically involves a single entity
(the vulnerable executable) and the attack input is usually in
the form of a string.
2) Bug Finding: We use the EditEventActivity ac-
tivity of the com.android.calendar app as an example
victim activity. In the skeleton app, the main activity of the
skeleton app starts the malicious activity, denoted by M . The
goal of the attack is that M , when it is started, will reside in
the same task as the victim activity. A bug is identified if such
attacks against the victim activity is feasible. We capture the
heap memory snapshot when the victim app and the skeleton
app are started and the main activity of the skeleton app is
ready to start the malicious activity.
Figure 11 shows the rough procedure
of starting the malicious activity. The API
Activity.startActivity(Intent, Bundle) is
invoked with the parameters specifying the activity to be started,
i.e., M . The invocation leads to a service request to be handled
by the service interface method startActivity in AMS.
The operations of selecting the task hosting the new activity
are performed in startActivityUncheckedLocked,
which has eight parameters as shown in Figure 12. The first
parameter r is an ActivityRecord instance storing the
information of M , while the second storing that of the caller
activity. The description of other parameters is omitted. They
are set to symbolic inputs.
The constraint indicating that the task selected for M is
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Fig. 13. Examples of concrete input values generated in case study 2.
// Illegal concrete values
(r.intent.mFlags == 0x11000000) &&
(r.launchMode == LAUNCH_SINGLE_TOP) &&
(r.mLaunchTaskBehind == true) &&
(options == null) &&
(r.info.documentLaunchMode == 0) &&
(r.info.targetActivity == null) &&
(r.resultTo == null) &&
(r.taskAffinity != "android.task.calendar") &&
(r.intent.mComponent.mClass == "com.android.
calendar.EditEventActivity") &&
(r.intent.mComponent.mPackage == "com.android.
calendar")
// Legal concrete values
(r.intent.mFlags == 0x10080000) &&
(r.launchMode == LAUNCH_SINGLE_TASK) &&
(r.mLaunchTaskBehind == true) &&
(options == null) &&
(r.resultTo == null) &&
(r.info.documentLaunchMode == 0) &&
(r.info.targetActivity == null) &&
(r.taskAffinity == "android.task.calendar")
TABLE III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GENERATED EXPLOITS.
Android version 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.0
# of effective exploits 434 674 674 674 702 810
exactly the one hosting the victim activity is added to each of
the path conditions when it is to be resolved. A feasible path
is found if the path condition is resolvable.
3) Exploit Generation: The symbolic execution generated
2,020 sets of concrete input values, among which some contain
illegal concrete values, e.g., due to requiring the malicious
activity’s package and activity names to be equal to those of
the victim activity. Simple scripts were written to filter out
illegal concrete values, the number of which is 1,210 sets totally.
Figure 13 (upper part) shows an example of illegal concrete
values; it is illegal because its package name is duplicate with
that of the victim app, but Android requires that each app
should have a unique package name.
Figure 13 (lower part) shows an example of the rest 810
sets of legal concrete values. In this example, r.intent.mFlags
and options guide how to set the input parameters of
startActivity for starting the malicious activity; others
instruct how to configure the malicious activity; for example,
r.launchMode is mapped to the android:launchMode
in the manifest file. Figure 14 shows the exploit according to
the set of concrete values. When users click the app icon of
the malicious app in the home screen, the main activity will
be started and it is coded to call startActivity to start
the malicious activity, which will reside side by side with the
victim activity in the same task.
We then examined whether the exploits generated on
Android 5.0 were effective on other versions of Android systems.
Table III lists the results, which show that the effectiveness
of the exploits are affected by the versions of Android
systems. Further investigation has revealed that the difference
is mainly caused by code changes. For example, the new
exploiting condition FLAG_ACTIVITY_NEW_DOCUMENT is
not introduced until Android 5.0 (discussed below); the API
Fig. 14. Exploit generated from the concrete input values.
// Snippet of AndroidManifest.xml
<activity android:name=".maliciousActivity"
android:launchMode="singleTask"
android:taskAffinity="android.task.calendar"
android:documentLaunchMode="none" />
// The main activity starts the malicious activity
public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
...
Intent i = new Intent(this, maliciousActivity.
class);
intent.setFlags(0x10080000);
startActivity(i, null);
}
Fig. 15. Exploiting condition.
(((((r.intent.mFlags & 0x7F7FFFFF) | 0x10000000) |
0x8000000) | 0x10000000) & 0x80000) != 0x80000
startActivity(Intent, Bundle) is not included in
version 4.0, and thus only exploits with options == null
can be used for invoking startActivity(Intent).
Newly discovered exploiting condition. The path condi-
tions generated from symbolic execution reveal a new exploiting
condition, as shown in Figure 15, that was not reported
in previous work [36]. Here, 0x80000 represents the flag
FLAG_ACTIVITY_NEW_DOCUMENT, which is introduced
since Android 5.0, and the seemingly complex condition simply
means the corresponding bit in the bitflags r.intent.mFlags
is 0. Compared to previous work that relies on ad hoc manual
effort for discovering the exploiting conditions, CENTAUR finds
them in a systematic and automatic way.
D. Consistency of Exploits Generated with Different Snapshots
We then investigated whether snapshots captured at different
times affected exploit generation. After the system is initialized,
20 snapshots were captured at intervals of 5 minutes on Android
5.0 with random user interactions during the intervals. For
each vulnerability listed in Table II, symbolic execution was
performed with each of the 20 snapshots providing the execution
context. The results show that, for each vulnerability, the
same sets of path conditions were generated with different
snapshots, which means that the resulting exploits with the
different snapshots are consistent.
There are several reasons that explain the consistency of
exploits. First, if a malicious app does not rely on other apps
to exploit a vulnerability (e.g., inconsistent security policy
enforcement), access control is enforced in Android Framework
to make sure the information of other apps is not accessed.
Thus, the configurations and statuses of other apps do not affect
the path exploration. On the other hand, for exploits that rely on
the statuses of other apps (e.g., the victim app in task hijacking
attacks), the path exploration probably depends on the statuses
of one or more apps. During symbolic execution, reasonable
setting up is established consistently; for example, the victim
activity should already be started in the task hijacking case
prior to capturing snapshots. The results show that an attack
succeeds as long as the same statuses recur.
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TABLE IV. EXECUTION TIME OF UCSE AND CENTAUR.
Vulnerability UCSE CENTAUR
ISPE in accessing GPS providers Out-of-mem 1m 42s
Task hijacking Out-of-mem 14m 33s
Finally, the values of non-app-specific variables do
not affect path exploration for the vulnerabilities we ex-
amined. For example, in the case of inconsistent secu-
rity policy enforcement for accessing the names of in-
stalled providers, the path exploration does not depend on
the concrete values of the related non-app-specific vari-
able (i.e., LocationManagerService.mProviders),
although different provider names may be returned by the
service calls if different providers are installed.
E. Comparison with Under-constrained Symbolic Execution
(UCSE)
Both CENTAUR and UCSE are able to start symbolic exe-
cution at any service interface method of Android Framework.
The major difference between the two is that UCSE does not
have the type and value information about the inputs, while
CENTAUR obtains the information from the execution context
provided by the concrete execution.
The first issue of applying UCSE to symbolic execution
of Android Framework is that virtual function calls are
frequently used, but the runtime types of the receiver objects
are unknown. UCSE constructs the receiver objects either using
lazy initialization based on the type hierarchy or relying on
manual specifications, which either explores spurious paths or
requires much manual effort.
The second issues is that input variables which are treated
as concrete inputs in CENTAUR are treated as symbolic inputs
in UCSE. UCSE handles such symbolic inputs using lazy
initialization, which causes the following problems: (1) loops
that iterate through collection data structures are unbounded,
and (2) the generated concrete values are unrealistic.
We tried to perform UCSE of Android Framework using
Java PathFinder, which kept crashing when it was applied
directly. We spent a lot of time and tedious effort modifying
the framework code (e.g., adding the type information about
objects pointed to by references to assist dynamic dispatching)
to make the symbolic execution possible. We thus only modified
the code with respect to the ISPE vulnerability of accessing the
GPS provider list and the task hijacking vulnerability. Table IV
shows the execution time applying the two techniques. Due to
path explosion UCSE in both cases ran out of memory.
Therefore, path exploration without precise information
of the execution context causes many problems, such as
requiring tedious manual effort, generating unrealistic outputs,
and exploring spurious paths. CENTAUR resolves the problems
by migrating the execution context from the concrete execution
world to symbolic execution.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Mixing Concrete/Symbolic Execution. DART is the first
concolic testing tool that uses symbolic analysis in concert with
concrete execution to improve coverage of random testing [21].
It runs the tested unit code on random inputs and symbolically
gathers constraints at decision points that use input values; then,
it negates one of these symbolic constraints to generate the next
test case. EGT [9], EXE [10] and KLEE [8] execute external
code concretely by using one of the possible concrete values
of the symbolic operands. S2E introduces selective symbolic
execution, which allows a program’s paths to be explored
without having to model its surrounding environment [13].
These techniques usually take advantage of concrete execution
to simplify complex symbolic constraints and execute external
code, while CENTAUR makes use of concrete execution to set
up the execution context for symbolic execution.
Switching Concrete Execution to Symbolic Execution. Sym-
bolic PathFinder (SPF) begins with concrete execution and can
switch to symbolic execution at any point in the program [32].
CENTAUR allocates concrete execution and symbolic execution
to two decoupled systems, so that the two systems can evolve
independently. As SPF aims at generating unit test cases, it
simply specifies function parameters as symbolic inputs, while
CENTAUR finds out variables derived from the malicious app
and uses them as symbolic inputs.
Bug Finding. Fuzzing and symbolic execution have been
applied to checking the existence of bugs. For example,
Miller et al. proposed a blackbox fuzzing technique that sends
unstructured random inputs to an application program and
considers a failure to be a crash or hang [29]. It is mainly
used to reveal input validation bugs [31], [11]. SAGE is a bug
finding system [22], which leverages the technique described in
DART [21]. SAGE has demonstrated symbolic execution can
be very useful for bug finding. Through symbolic execution of
Android Framework, CENTAUR shows its effectiveness for bug
finding as well.
Exploit Generation. Automatic patch-based exploit generation
(APEG) generates exploits based on information in patches [7].
Compared to APEG, AEG does not require access to patches.
Both APEG and AEG target stand-alone native executables for
exploit generation, while CENTAUR considers exploit generation
in an environment that manages all executables running on it.
Many unique challenges not seen in stand-alone executables
have to be addressed by CENTAUR.
Symbolic Execution of Android Apps. There has been a lot of
work that leverages symbolic execution for testing Android apps.
For example, Jensen et al. proposed to use concolic execution
to build summaries of the individual event handlers and then
generate event sequences backward, in order to find event
sequences that reach a given target line of code in the Android
app [27]. SIG-Droid combines program analysis techniques
with symbolic execution to generate event sequences as well
as input values [30]. All use symbolic execution to exercise
application code. To our knowledge, our system is the first one
that supports symbolic execution of Android Framework.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the first system for automatic generation
of exploits that take advantage of Android Framework vulner-
abilities. To avoid state space explosion due to the complex
initialization, concrete execution is used for the initialization
phase, providing execution context to symbolic execution.
Among the large number of variables in execution context,
slim tainting tracks characteristic access patterns to identify
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variables derived from the malicious apps as symbolic inputs.
In order to decouple the implementation of CENTAUR from
Android, the execution context provided by concrete execution
is migrated from the Android ART VM to a Java VM. We
have implemented the system and evaluated it. The evaluation
shows that CENTAUR is very effective in both bug finding
and exploit generation. CENTAUR is also the first system that
enables symbolic execution of Android Framework. Given that
symbolic execution has proven to be a very useful technique,
we plan to apply CENTAUR to other purposes in future work,
such as automatic API specification generation, fine-grained
malware analysis, and testing.
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